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A PRUDENTIAL TAKE ON A PRUDENTIAL 
TAKINGS DOCTRINE 
Katherine Mims Crocker* 
The Supreme Court is set to decide a case requesting reconsideration of a 
doctrine that has long bedeviled constitutional litigants and commentators. 
The case is Knick v. Township of Scott, and the doctrine is the "ripeness" rule 
from Williamson County Regio nal Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank 
that plaint~ffs seeking to raise takings claims under the Fifth Amendment must 
pursue state-created remedies first- the so-called "compensation prong" (as 
distinguished from a separate "takings prong"). This Essay argues that to put 
the compensation prong in the best light possible, the Court should view the 
requirement as a "prudential" rule rather than (as it has previously done) a 
constitutional one. It then argues that the Court should reject this doctrine not 
because it is a prudential rule, which would follow a larger trend in recent case 
discussions, but because it is a bad prudential rule. This path is the prudential 
one because casting doubt on prudential rules more generally could cause a 
significant set of additional doctrines to suffer unintended and unwelcome 
consequences. 
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INTRl)D1.:CTll)N 
The Supreme Court is set to a case requesting reconsideration of 
a doctrine that stands as a "major barrier[] to federal court adjudication" of 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights.1 The case is Knick v, Township of Scott,' and 
the doctrine is the rule from Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank3 that plaintiffs to raise claims 
under the Fifth Amendment must pursue state-created remedies I call 
this rule the "compensation prong" Williamson County also 
articulated a "takings prong," which I describe below), 
This advances two arguments, The first is that the Court should 
view the compensation prong as a "prudential" rule rather than a 
constitutional one, Williamson County described the compensation prong as 
a "ripeness" requirenu:nt, that it prevents courts from deciding 
disputes that are not ready for review. Courts sometimes think as 
a constitutiona1 command grounded in Artide III's case-or-controversy 
limitation. With respect to the compensation prong, however, courts 
sometimes think of as a different kind of constitutional coJrnnnruJd, 
one grounded in the Fifth Amendment Alternatively, courts sometimes 
think of ripeness not as a constitutional command at all~ but as a principle 
grounded in prudential, or policy. considerations. 
What 1 call the Williamson County "ripeness puzzle" asks to which of 
these categories courts should view the compensation prong as belonging.' 
For mainly consequentialist reasons, I argue that a prudential solution puts 
the rule in the best possible, The Supreme Court should thus view the 
compensation prong as "a self-imposed, common law limit on federal 
jurisdiction designed to foster core values" of federalism inherent 
in providing state courts the first at property disputes,5 
The second argument that Essay advances is that the Supreme Court 
should abandon the compensation prong-but that it should also proceed 
with caution, For although the reqnirement may sound like a narrow issue of 
narrow concern, doing away with it coutd threaten to disrupt or in some 
instances destroy rules including the political-question doctrine, the general 
prohibition against third-party standing, and many more,6 
1. Thomas W" Mcrrili, Essa)', Anficipaiory ReerJedies ,,im 
1630, 1633 (2015), 
128 IL\RV. L. R.EV. 
2. 862 E3d 310, 314 {Jd Cir. 2017), cer!. grante.;tin 138$. Ct. 1262 (2018) (mcm.), 
3. 473 u.s. 172 (1985]. 
4. Fur a more detailed discussion of this "ripeness " see Katherine Mims 
Crocker, ju51ifyi11ga Prudential Solution to the Williamson County Ripeness Puzzle, 49 GA. L 
REV. 163 
5. fred 0. Smith, Jr, Uruiemocra!i;: &ttntint, 70 VANLJ. L. REv. 845, 853 (2017). 
6. The Court have cerr in Knkk for the very purpose of ahobshing the 
cnmpcnsation prong. its consJJeratlon of the case tn the reconsideration 
cerl on J. m:parate ground for review. See Petition for \Vrit of Certiorari at I. 
Scott, No. 17-647 i U.S, Oct. 31, 1017) (presenting a second question 
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There are two key ways that the compensation prong, understood as 
prudential in character, could come to an end in Knick. First, the Court 
could the doctrine simply because it rests on prudential concerns, a 
relatively broad ruling. Doing so would follow a trend in recent case 
discussions denigrating prudential rules in the jurisdictional context 
Secon•d, the Court could reject the balance of policy priorities underlying the 
doctrine, a relatively narrow ruling. In other words, the Court could scrap 
the compensation prong not because it ls a prudential principle, but because 
it is a bad prudential principle. 
I argue, again for consequentialist reasons, that the second option 
provides the more prudential path forward, for the first option could cause a 
sweeping assortment of doctrines to suffer unintended and unwelcome 
consequences. In Knick, therefore, the Court should regard the 
compensation prong as prudential in character but renounce it on otber 
grounds. And beyond Knick, the Court should reconsider other purportedly 
prudential limitations on federal jurisdiction in cases that more squarely 
present them. 
These arguments unfold as follows. Part I describes the decisional 
backgronnd leading up to Knick. Part II outlines the case for a prudential 
characterization of the compensation prong. Part Ill discusses the recent 
trend toward repudiating prudential principles. Part IV outlines a prudential 
path lorward. I conclude that the Court should forsake the compensation 
prong in Knick not because it is a prudential rule, but because it is a bad 
prudential rule. I further rondude that the Court should adopt a 
particularized approach to prudential principles beyond the 
present matter. 
I. FROM WILLIAMSON COUNTY TO KNICK 
The Court has decided two major compensation-prong cases: 
Williamson County in 1985 and San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of 
San Francisco' in 2005. 
In Williamson County, a bank seeking to develop land asserted that 
county zoning requirements violated the Takings Clause of the Fiftb 
Amendment,' which says that "private property" shall not be "taken for 
public use~ \vithout just compensation. "9 The bank sued won in 
court, but the Supreme Court held the bank's claim improper. 10 
regarding a circuit split over the rn;.atmcnt uf facial takings claims). And the grant 
came on c.f a dissent from the denial of ccrt in Gnierprtscs v, Town o_f 
Durham, in which lwu fustkes pressed their coUeagucs to rethink pmn~ See 
136 S. Ct. 1409 (20! 6) {Thomas,)., joined by Kennedy,)., dl<>;entlngtro;;n <i~nlal 
7. 545 us :12> (2005). 
8. WilliamsOti Cty., 473 U.S. at 175. 
9. U.S. CONST. atncnd. V. 
10. ti/i?Uamson 473 U5. at175, 200 that "[a]tthough lhe verdict 
~in favor of re~:mnder•tl was rejected by rhc Distrkr which a judgment 
42 Michigan Law Review Online (VoL 117:39 
Williamson County articulated two rules, First, the Court said, a federal 
takings claim "is not ripe until the government entity charged with 
implementing the regnlations has reached a final decision regarding the 
application of the regnlations to the property at issue," meaning 
prospective plaintiffs must obtain such decisions before suing.U I call this the 
"takings prong" because the textual hook to the Fifth Amendment, to the 
extent that one existed, was that it is impossible for property to be "taken" 
before a final dedsion occurs.12 
Second (and more significantly for present purposes), the Court said, 
"[t]he Filth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it 
proscribes taking without just compensation,"13 And "all that is required" to 
permit the possibility of just compensation, the Court continued, "is that a 
'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation' 
exist at the time of the taking."''' The Court held that prospective plaintiffs 
must pursue such mechanisms to their dain1s~ which couJd include 
suing under an "inverse-condemnation" cause of action in state court15 I call 
this the "compensation prong" because the textual hook to the Fifth 
Amendment was that "no constitutional violation occurs until just 
compensation has been denied, "16 
The Supreme Court returned to the compensation prong in San Remo 
Hotel, holding that issues decided in state courts by virtue of Williamson 
Count'yhave effect in later federal suits." The facts and procedural 
history of San Remo Hotel are complex, but the plaintiffs unsuccessfully 
pursued unripe federal takings claims in federal court, unsuccessfully 
litigated state takings daims in state court, and then unsuccessfully 
attempted to reas.o;ert their federal takings claims in federal courL18 The 
Supreme Court affirmed the application of issue preclusion under the Full 
Faith and Credit Statute to turn aside the second federal suit. 19 
The in San Remo Hotel was twofold, First, the Court 
explained that courts may not "simply create exceptions" to the statute 
nolwilhstan,llng the verdict to petitioners, the verdict was reinstated on Bfl'flt!al" and 
umduding that claim was prcrnaturc). 
11. ld. at H!ti 
12. See id. at 190-91. 
13. Id" at 194. 
14. ld. (q\loting Ro:g'l Rail Reorganization Ad Otl!C£, 419 U.S. 102, 124-125 ( 1974)}, 
15. ld. at t94-96; see Inverse Condemnution, BLACK's LAW DrcrrONARY (lOth ed. 2014) 
(defining: inverse condemnation as "[ajn action 
from a governmental cntily that has taken the 
condemnation proceedl11gs"). 
16. lrVilliamson Cty., 473 L'.S. at 194 n.B (en>pl>.si< 
prc>PCJ'tv <1wrrcrforcompensat:ion 
propt'Tty Y.i!hout bringing formal 
17. San Remo Hotel. L,P. v, Cily & Cty. of San Fnmdsco, 545 U.S. 323,347-48 {2005). 
IR ld. at 330-35. 
19. ld. at 347-43.. 
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wherever they ~deem them appropriate."'" Second, the Court reasoned that 
the Ia w does no! require a federal forum for all federal claims. Instead, the 
Court said that " [ s ]tate comts are fully competent to adjudicate 
constitutional to local land-use decisions" and that "state courts 
undoul:>tedly have more than federal courts do in the 
complex factual, technical, and legal questions" underlying some pr<lperty 
disputes. 21 
Chief Rehnquist, by three others, concurred in the 
judgment, Rehnquist urged his colleagues to revisit the compensation prong, 
observing that the upshot of San Remo Hotel was that "litigants who go to 
stale court to seek compensation will likely be unable later to assert their 
federal takings claims in federal court."" 
Fast-forward to K11ick, the pending case. Rose Mary Knick ov.'Tls land in 
the of Scott, Pennsylvania.23 township enacled an ordinance 
reqmrmg all cemeteries be "open and accessible to the general public 
during daylight hours."24 Government officials entered Knick's land and 
declared her in violation of the ordinance because certain stones on her 
property were believed to be grave markers.25 Knick sued the township in 
federal court, Fifth Amendment takings claims.26 The district court 
held the claims unripe under the compensation prong because Knick had 
not sought compensation in an inverse-condemnation action in state courtP 
The Third Circuit aftlrmed,28 and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
case.20 Oral argument occurred on October 3, 2018.'" and a decision should 
come down by June 2019. 
20. ld- at 344, 
21. 1d. at 347, 
22. ld. at 351 {Rehnquist, Cl., _ioined by O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., 
mncurdnu in the Of note. the Court decided Kelo v. Umdon, 545 l!.K 
469 and v. Chevron U5"'t Inc., 544 U.S. 528 {2005), 
Hotel. "raken these three decisions represent a suhstafitia~ chang<!-<:nti,.-ely 
direction of relegating takings issues tn the political anti legal ,iudgmcnts states." 
A. Fletcher, Keynote Address, Keto, Liogle, anti San Rcmo Hotel: Takings Ltnv Now Belongs to 
the Stales, 46 SAl\"TA CLARA L .REV. 767,776 (2006). 
23. Knkkv. ofScott,862F3d310,3l5(3dClr.2tl17).,cert 13SS. 
Ct. 1262 {2018) 
24. Id. 
25. hi. Knick has prcvinnsl;v dls;>olcdthat there b: a cemetery nn her land. Td. 
26. [d_ aL315-16. 
27. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, No. 3:14-CV -02223,2016 WL 4701549, at '"6-lM.D. Pa. S.:pt. 
t:l, 2016). 
28. Kmck, 8.62 F.3d at 328. 
29. Knid v. Twp. n(Smu, l3R S. ct. 1262 (20U?) {mend (granting cerlinrari). 
30. Supreme Court of ibt• Urtiit'd Simes: October Term 2018, SUP. CT. (July 9, 2mB}, 
Michigan Law Review Online (VoL 117:39 
JL TflE CASE HJR A PRUDENTfAL Ctl ARAGl'ERfZA'rtON 
As I have discussed in prior work, the Williamson ripeness 
puzzle asks whether courts should regard the compensation prong as arising 
from constitutional commands or prudential rm•fe,rer1cesY 
The constitutional solution lo the 1Villiamson County ripeness puzzle 
indudes two First, courts sometimes think of rlpeness as a 
constitutional command grounded in Article II!'s case-or-controversy 
limitation, As the D.C. Circuit has explained: "Article Ill ... limits federal 
court to ca;,;es and controversies. Consistent with this limitation 
and 'our theoretical role as the governmental branch of last resort,' the 
ripeness doctrine precludes premature adjudication of 'abstract 
disagreements' and instead reserves judicial power for resolution 
and 'fully crystalit,ed' disputes."" The compensation prong could thus 
rej>reserlt a jurisdictional of what renders a federal takings claim 
cognizable under Article III. 33 
Second, in the context of the compensation prong, courts sometimes 
think of ripeness as a constitutional command grounded in the Fifth 
Amendment As Williamson County itself stated, "because the Fifth 
Amendment proscribes takings without just compensation, no constitutional 
violation occurs until just compensation has been denied."34 
compensation prong could thus represent a substantive element of what 
renders a federal takings claim actionable.35 
The prudential solution to the Williamson County ripeness puzzle turns 
on a different understanding of the where courts someth:nes think 
of ripeness not as a constitutional command at all, but as a principle 
gronnded in policy considerations. As the Second Circuit has explained: 
"[W ]hen a court declares that a case is not prudentially ripe, it means that 
the case 'Nill be better decided later .... It does not mean that the case is not 
a real or concrete dispute affecting cognizable current concerns of the 
31. rhc majority of this Part summariLe£ the argument from my prcvjm1s 
publication on the compcn&ation prong, Sec Crod:cr. supra note 4. 
32. Va.ttdcrKam v. Vanderl<am, 776 F3d &83, 888 (LlC Cir" 2015) (citation tmlittt'll) 
(quming Nut'l Treasury Emp.\ Union Y. G'nited States, 101 t:.3rll423, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 19%)). 
33. $e-e Flying} Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F3d 538, 544 (7th. Cir. 2008) ('The 
nf Wiiliam;;rm County is tllat there ls no case or mntroversy within the meaning of 
until the plaintiff has pursued all available remedies m state cnurt .... "). 
34. 473 U.S. 172, 194 n.B (!985). 
35. See Clem: R, ~ichoi, Jr., Rip1.mcss aml :he Constituifo:n, 54 U. CHI. L REV. 153, 164-
70, 170 (1987). In Knirk, the Sohntnr Genernl Hied an amkw> lmefthat seems to embra;;e this 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment hut that treats the proug as arising fmm 
42 U.S. C. § 1983. See Brief for the lJnited States as Amicus m St!pporl ofVacatm and 
Remand al 19-21. Knick v. Twp. of Stott, No. 17-647 {U.S. fune 5, 2018). Respondents then 
this apparently novcl as welt Sec Brief for .ResponJems at 36, Knick, No. 17-
July 30, 201 Bl. This of Lhc tompen;;ation for 
several reaf;t;nts, as KniCk's reply brief Jtscus.ses. Sec Petitioner's 4-9, Kotek, No. 
17-647 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2018). 
Oc!uhcr 2018] A Prudential Take 45 
within the meaning of Article I!I."36 The compensation prong could thus rest 
on the subconstilutional federalism concerns tbat San Remo Hole/ invoked-
spedftcally, that slate courts can adequately handle federal constitutional 
challenges and address property disputes. 37 
In Knick, the Supreme Court should the compensation prong as 
prudential in character. For the descriptive re<~sons that follow, this would be 
most consistent with the diret-lion of the Court's evolving statements on the 
topic. And for the normative reasons that follow, this would put the 
requirement in the hest light which is important in case the 
doctrine survives and to rest any potential rejection on the firmest 
footing. 
On a descriptive the Supreme Court has taken several steps toward 
ascribing a prudential makeup to the compensation prong, Rehnquist noted 
this shill in his separate opinion in San Remo Hotel. In Williamson County, 
Rehnquist recalled, the Court had "purported to interpret the Fifth 
Amendment in divining [the compensation prong[."1' But "[mJore recently," 
he "we have referred to [the compensation prong] as merely a 
prudentia) requirern:ent."39 
Rehnquist cited Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,40 which had 
called the Williamson County requirements "prudential hurdles.''41 Before 
San Rema Hotel, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Cauncil42 had 
also stated that a Williamson County issue went "only to the prudential 
'ripeness' of [tbe plaintiffs] challenge."41 And after San Remo the 
Court in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection44 declared the compensation prong non-
jurisrlktional.45 The Court made a sirnilar remark in Horne v. of 
Agnculture,4<• stating that "[a]lthough we often refer to [tbe compensation 
prong] as prudential 'ripeness,' we have recognized that it is not, strictly 
speaking, jurisdictional.''47 
Accordingly, the trend in Supreme Court opinions toward a 
reimagining of the prong as in This also 
appears to have become the dominant position in the pages of academi~ 
36. SniHUI.Jfid;~ v_ lNS, 326 E3d 35L 357 (2d Cir, 2003). 
37. See Stewart l~. Sterk, The Demise Utiga1ion, 48 WM. & MARY L 
REV. 251,285 (2006). 
38. San Rcmo Hotel, LP. v. City & Cty. of Sa11 l:ran;.;ist;-tl, 545 L'.S. 323, 349 (2005) 
(Rehnqu!M, C.}., cou..:urring in the judgment). 
39. Id. 
40. 520 u.s. 725 (199/t 
41. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733-34. 
42. 5()5 u.s. HJ()3 (!991). 
43. I.ucas, 505 U.S. at 1012-13. 
44. 560 u.s. 702 (2010]. 
45. Stop the Read!, 560 l;'.S.at 719 &n.HL 
46. 569 u.s. 513 (2013). 
47. 1-Ionte, 569 U.S. Jt 526. 
46 Michigan Law Review Online (VoL 117:39 
journa!s.4H But in each case outlined above, the Court's comments were dicta 
or failed to exclude an understanding of the prong based in 
the Fifth Amendment.49 And views continue to crop up in law 
reviews."' This means that more than a decade alier Rehnquist criticized the 
majority in San Remo Hotel for "conspicuously leav[ing] open" the question 
whether the compensation prong "is merely a prudential rule, aod not a 
constitutional mandate,"51 the question remains open today.51 
On a normative level, two points bear considering. First, textual and 
historical arguments east doubt on the initial framing of the compensation 
prong as part and parcel of the Fifth Amendment. 53 With respect to text, 
there is a good argument that the "most natural[]" reading of the 
amen,hnent is that "'compensation must the ' and not 
that 'the daimant shall have the opportunity to the compensation 
remedy in a post-taking court action.' "5'' And with respect to history, among 
other things, commentators and judges have argued that "[d]uring the 
century following the ratification of the Bill of Rights and parallel state 
provisions~ courts held that compensation must be provided at the time of 
the act ... alleged to be a taking."" 
48. See, e.g., J. David Brecmer, The Rebirth of Federal 
"Prudential" Answer to VVilHamson Onmty's J.Jawet.i State UtigatiorJ Requirement:, 30 
TOCRO L. REV. 319 {201-1); see also Merrill, supra note 1, at 1648-49, 1651-52 that 
a prudential Sttlulion to the l•{fllianu;m County ripeness puzzle is to 
constitutional possibHity). 
49. In Suitum anrl T.ucas, only the Wiiliarnsmr Courtly takings prong was at issue. See 
Suitum v, Tahoe Reg'\ Agency, 520 U$. 725, 734 0997}; Lucas v. S.C. C'..oastal 
Cnundl, 505 FS. HJ03, 1012-13 And dedarlng the non-jurisdictional 
in Stop the Reach and F-lorne, the C.ourt at most an based in Article m, 
for an undcrstaudmg bast'tl in the t:iilh Amendment "duel! not relate to jurisdicllondl at 
all." ~ichoi. supra note 35, at 162, Horne's statement also have been dictum, one 
reason because the Court conduded that petitioners had no and that theu 
claim was See 569 U.S.. at 527-28. 
50. W. Schwartz, j\'o Competing 'fheory !!( Corrst.itulinnal 
Interpretation 34 S'l'A:.. ENVTL I..J. 247, 296 & n.l2.2 
(20I5l (arguing that Slap and Suilum "inn:rre\tly ,;haracterized lViUianL$1;ln County's 
stat<.' <."ompensaHon n::quircmcnltls pmdential"). 
51. 545 U.S. 323, 351 n.2 (101J5} (Rdl.Hqu.ist, C.L mnt::urring in the judgnwnt). 
52. Indeed. in dissenting from the .::ert denial in Justke Thomas noted that 
"sen:ral Courts of Appeals continue to trt\11 the Wiliiamson rule as a JuriMlktional nd~c' 
the courts' power to consider federal claims the plaintiff'< exhaust state-
'"nneJJes." 136 S. Ct. 1409, 1412 (2016) ('l'homas, J,, dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
53. See t\ferril[, supra note I, at 1647-49 a sin>llar a>-gument). 
136 S. Ct. at t4W (Timm<L". J, dL'iscnt.ing from denial of certiorari) 
Erecmcr, V\"ilHamsnn Procedures Rule: 
l9mlrqsrary E:m~ditm Uprn 
the 209, 219 
(200311. 
ss. ld, (quoting ). Dtwid Hrecmcr, Overcoming Williamson CQtmty's State 
Procedures Rule: How Jlre England Reservation, Issue Preclusion lixceptirms., 
Oc!uhcr 2018] A Prudential Take 47 
Second, vie1ving the compensation prong as prudential in character 
would appear to inflict the least damage on litigants and courts. Prudential 
rules, after all, are susceptible to exceptions based on policy considerations, 
but constitutional rules defining the casc-or-controversy requirement or the 
substantive merits of a claim generaJly are not 56 
Commentators have found numerous reasons to criticize the 
compensation prong. As one author notes, scholars have called it "deceptive, 
inherently draconian, and a Kafkaesque ma7.e, among other 
unflattering things:'57 For purposes of iUustrating rather than exhausting the 
doctrine's: possible adverse effe<:ts, therefore, consider two circumstances 
that commentators have contended could cause the compensation prong to 
produce steep and senseless consequences. The first concerns removal. and 
the second concerns dafm preclusion, 
First: removaL As justice Thomas recently explained, " [ w]hen a plaintiff 
files a suit in state court to exhaust his remedies as Williamson County 
instructs; state-government entities and offidals may remove that suit to 
federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441."58 But "[o]nce in federal court, some 
state defendants have moved to dismiss on the ground that 'the plaintiff did 
not litigate first in the state court."'59 An~ Thorn"'' some have 
succeeded, with federal courts claims instead of remanding 
them.60 Such "gamesmanship,'' Thomas argued, "leaves plaintiffs with no 
court in which to pursue their claims. "61 A prudential understanding of the 
compensation prong would allow courts to avoid this outcome. 
hold, for example, that removing a federal takings claim from state court to 
federal court causes the defendant to forfeit any compensation-prong 
argumenL62 
Second: claim San Remo Hotel focused on issue preclusion. 
But commentators have contended that its reasoning could also lead to claim 
preclusion in a meaningful number thus keeping additional federal 
takings claims out of federal court'; Foreclosing a federal forum for the 
l:XceJtfiorr the Federal Courllrouse Door fa Ripe Claims, 18 J. LAt\D USE & L::-;rv. L 
209,220 (20{1))). 
56. Apparently for this reason will1 respect to Artidc m, in Am,goni, ThomJs frann:d 
the Court's at a prudential characterization of the compensation prong as an effort to 
"a meliDrate effeas." I d. at 1411. 
57. Ian l;ein, Note, Why Judicial 'J'akings Are Unripe, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 749,774 (2011} 
(mternal q_tto)lafk:m marks onutted); see also, e.g, Maureen E, '1fu; Darnagfngs Ciuuses, 
104 VA. L l{r.V. 341, 41JS (201~) (calling the compz•ns,ali<m prong of the most mahg>>cd 
m~cs in condemnation law"). 
58. itrrigoni, 136 $.Cr. at 1411 (Thomas, J,, dissenting fmm denial of ccrt1omrt). 
59. ld. (quoting Mki,ael M. !)crgcr & Gideon Kanm:r,. Shell Gumd 1"rru Can't Gt't 11~t•rc 
from Here: Supn;me Cma·t Ripmi!JS in Takings Casr':: at Iong l :.!$! R?ttchr:J thr 
Self-l',r~rotiVSIUZC, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 673 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. See Dreemer, suprJ1 note 48, at 342-45. 
63. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 37, at 276-83. 
48 Michigan Law Review Online (VoL 117:39 
vindication of a federal constitutional right is problematic in itselt: Even 
worse is tbe added possibility that a constitutional understanding of the 
compensation prong could lead courts to forbid plaintiffs from bringing 
federal claims in state courts too. 
To understand this possibility, return to the two potential constitutional 
solutions to the Williamson County ripeness puzzle. For interpretations of 
Article Ill, federal rules are generally viewed as inapplicable in state courts61 
But states can choose to adopt their own rules equal or stricter 
requirements.''' For inteqpretations of the Fifth Amendment, the same rules 
apply in federal and state courts. Under either scenario, " [ t}he federal ta~cin)tS 
claim simply does not exist before the state inverse condemnation claim is 
resolved, and may not, therefore, he considered alongside the state claim in 
state court."66 
A plaintiff could try to avoid this possibility by bifurcating her claims-
in particular, by litigating a predicate slate claim before bringing a federal 
takings claim in state court. But it is possible that a state court would hold 
that slate claim-preclusion rules do not allow such bifurcation. If federal 
claim-preclusion rules would bar a federal takings claim in federal court, 
then state claim-preclusion rules would presumably bar the same claim in 
state court. Intersystem preclusion in federal court, after all, reflects the 
intrasystem preclusion rules of the judgment-rendering state.67 
Combining a constitutional wlution to the Williamson County ripe:nes;s 
puzzle with the possibility of state-court claim preclusion thus presents a 
situation where a federal takings claim could "go from green to 
rotten without ever being ripe."'" A prudential solution, however, would 
allow courts to this hy permitting plaintif(s !o prosecute 
66. Kathryn E, Kova~.;;, Accepting the Chlims ro Stt~te Courts: The 
Federal Courts' Attempts to Wiiliamsnn County, 26 
ECOLOGY LQ.l. l3 
67. .)ee Allen v. ~kCurry, 449 P.S. 90., 96 ( 1980) that under the Full Faith and 
Crerlit Statt1te\ "Congress has sper:itlca.lly all federal .:ourts to predosive eHEct to 
stale-court whenever the coorls of the Stale from which judgment:; enu:rgcd 
would do 
hR John Martinez & Karen L Mutincz, A Prudential Theory for Providing a Forum for 
Federal Claims, 36 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J, 445, 431 (2001)> see also Michael ~L 
lkrgcr & Gideon Kanner, Shdl Gmm;t r<m Cnn 't ('JCt 
Jur'is~>ruu!ctLAt in Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-P<lrO<.lv 
709-10 {2004). There are workdrounds for thi~; quagmire, is why f treat thi" 
situation as a prn;sibility r;tth1:rti<an a cert.ainty. 
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predicate state claims and federal takings claims side-by-side in state courts. 
Rehnquist made a similar point in San Rema Hotel. The majority assumed in 
dictum that Williamson County did not apply in state courts.69 This 
assumption could correct, Rehnquist said, only if the compensation prong 
re]>reset>!ed "a prudential rule" rather than "a constitutional mandate,"70 
In short, fhe compensation prong is best viewed as a prudential rule, and 
the Supreme Court should analyze it as such in Knick. 
IlL THE TREND TOWARD RBPIJD!AT!NG PRUDENTIAL PRINCIPLES 
The Supreme Court has prudential limitations on federal 
jurisdiction in two recent cases: Lexmark International, Inc, v. Static Control 
Components, lnc.'1 and Susan B. Anthony List v. Driei!aus.72 
In Lexmark, the Court (unanimously) said that the concept of prudential 
standing "is ln some tension with ... the principle that 'a federal court's 
obligation to hear and decide' cases within its jurisdiction 'is virtually 
unflagging."' 73 The Court stated that "[jjust as a court cannot apply its 
independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of action that Cc·mpres" 
has denied, it cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created nu::rd)· 
because 'prudence' dictates."" The Court concluded that the "zone-of-
interests" inquiry, which asks whether a cause of action "encompasses a 
particular plaintiffs " was a doctrine of statutory h1terpretati011 rather 
than of prudential standing,75 
In Susan B. Anthony List, the Court (again unanimou..dy) criticized 
prudential by Lexmark. In particular, the Court "[t]o 
the extent respondents would have us deem petitioners' daims 
nonjttsticiable 'on that are prudential, rather than constitutional,' 
'fhat request is in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of fhe principle 
fhat a federal court's obligation to hear and decide' cases within its 
jurisdiction 'is virtually unflagging.' "76 But the Court concluded that it did 
not need to resolve the "continuing vitality" of the dnctrine in question 
because the rest was "easily satisfied" in favor of "prompt judicial review" in 
the case at bar ,77 
69. 5t',e San Remo Hotel, LP, v, City & Cty. u[San Frand~u. 545 \:.S. 323, 346 12005), 
70. 
compensation 
7!. 572 IJ.S. 1!8 (2014), 
72. 134 S. <:c 2334 (2014). 
73. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 126 {som>: internal qootaUon marks onntted) (quotmg $punt 
Commc'ns, Iru:. v. Jamhs., !l7l U.S. 69,77 (20l3)). 
74. ld.at l28(dtulionomiHed}, 
75. ld. at L27. 
76. Sus(m 13. Attflwny J,lst, 134 S. Cr. at 2347 (altt--ralion ami some inb:mal quotation 
marks omitted) (quotirig Li'xmark, 527 U.S, at 125-26). 
77. Td. at2347, 
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The sentiments expressed in Lexmark and Susan B. Anthony List carry 
an uncertain but potentially significant scope} as commentators have noted.78 
On the one hand, Chief Marshall stated the classic principle that 
federal courts have "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction 
which is given, than to usurp that which is not " for either "would be 
treason to the constitution."" But on the other, Supreme Court has long 
recognized "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction."80 These "entrenched seem to "self-evidently 
contlict[]" where courts can decline to adjudicate cases be<:ause of prudential 
considerations,81 
So where can courts decline to adjudicate cases because of prudential 
considerations? Nobody can answer this question in a universal and 
universally way because "the boundaries between .;onstitutional, 
prudential, and statutory limits are not generally " but "are often 
blurred, porous, and contested."" It should come as little surprise, therefore, 
fhat fhe list of rules fhat have been identitled as prudential is long, 
Consider the following which are a sampling of 
recent scholarship examining doctrines that the Supreme Court or some of 
its members have treated as prudential: 
• The general prohibition against third-party standing, 
• The zone-of-interests standing test as applied to constitutional 
daims; 
• The standing prohibition on assert:inggerter~cllz<ed gtriev•an<:es, 
• The taxpayer-standing do<::! nne. 
• The standing rule for federnl-guestion eases about domestic 
relations} 
• The doctrine examining the fitness of the issues for 
review and the to the parties of delay, 
• At least some aspects 
• The adverseness requirement~ 
• At least some aspects of the political-question doctrine, 
• Abstention do·ctrines, 
• Some aspects of state sovereign immunity, and 
• The act-of-state doctrine.83 
To clarify, my point is not that these doctrines actually rest on 
prudential concerns. Indeed, the Court or some Justices have framed several 
7R. See, e.g., Crrn:l«tr, supra note 4, at 175-76; ErncJ;t A. Young, Prudemial Stmntlil•tg 
tl}ler Lexmark Intematiomd, Im:. v. Static C.onrrol Components, Inc., lO DUKE J. Co:xsT. L. 
PURPOL'Y 149(20l4). 
79. Cohens v. Vltginla. 19 U-S- (6 Wheat.) 2M. 404 (l821l. 
80. Allen v. u.s. 737, 751 ( 1984). 
81. Smith, supra note 5, at 847-48; supra note 78, at 161. 
82. Smith, supra note 5, at 851. 
83. See id. at 855-69; Young, supra note 78, at 150-63. 
Oc!uhcr 2018] A Prudential Take 51 
of these issues in constitutional or statutory terms.84 My point is instead that 
the dividing lines are disputed and often indistinct-and that far-flung 
limitations on federal jurisdiction are thus regarded as at least possibly 
prudential in character. The upshot is that criticisms nfprudential 
principlescould destabilize a swath doctrine. 85 
Litigants have already on the Court's recent statements to cast 
doubt on purportedly prudential beyond those at issue in Lexmark 
and Susan B. Anthony List. A prominent example occurred in Starr 
International Co. v. United States,86 in which Da,;d Boies and Paul Clement 
joined forces wilh others before the Supreme Court to challenge the general 
rule against third-party standing." they said, concluded that 
"federal courts shonld not decline to hear and decide cases within their 
jurisdiction based on grounds that are 'prudential' rather than 
constitutional."88 The Court denied cert in Starr, but the case generated a 
notable amount of apparent interest, including an unrequested response 
from the Solicitor General and a rescheduled spot on the Court's conference 
agenda. 89 
At bottom, as one scholar puts the matter, "[i]f the federal cnurts' 
jurisdictional obligations are meant to be truly 'unflagging,' a great deal of 
established doctrine will have to go,""' For the Supreme Court to echo in 
Knick the sentiments expressed in Lexmark and Susan B. Anthony List would 
encourage broadside attacks on a wide range of jurisdictional doctrines. 
IV. A PRJJDENT!At PATH FORWARD 
In light concerns about the trend toward repudiating prudential 
principles, how should the Supreme Court approach Knick and other rases 
that concern possibly prudential limitations on federal jurisdiction? 
In Knick, there is no need to color outside the lines of the compensation 
prong. Even if one sees the requirement as prudential in well-
established principles support overruling Williamson Cormty without 
overhauling jurisdictional jurisprudence. 
84. 8ee Smith, supra note 5, al 855-69: Young, SHpra note 78, at 153-55, 161-62. 
85. See Jod S. Nolette, Last Prudential Lexmark and [t;/nif'li"!liOIU, 
16 CEO. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 227, 237-53 (2018) posstblc "Jomluu of 
ex~Jiding Lesmark ( deaned up)), 
86. 856 JC.3J 953,957 (Fed. CiL 2017), cz>rt denied, 138 S. Ct. 1324 {2018) {mcm.). 
87. -See Nok>tte, supra note 85, at 236-37 (Jisctt:;:;ing Starr as pres~c•tHing an opportunity 
to tlcsh out the implications ofLr;,;x:mnrk). 
88. Petihon for Writ uf Certiorari at 17, Starr Int'l Co. v. t;ulte:d States, 138: S. Ct 1324 
(2017) (mern.) (No. 17-540). 
89. 8i!<! Docket Search, SUP. Cr., https://WW\V .. ,.upremecourtgov/reardLaspx? 
ftlena:me""! docket/ dot-ketftles/html/public/17-54fJ.html: I https:! /perma.ccl KP1' 4-D D99}. 
90. supra note 78, at t6t. I to ground the 
wne-of-interests more squarely in intent" ld. at 163. also agree that 
"the majority's discussion may spur far-reaching in l;(r\\' think and (cspeda:llrJ 
lalkabtHJl Id. all49. 
52 Michigan Law Review Online (VoL 117:39 
"Beyond workability," the Court has explained, "the relevant factors in 
deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the 
antiquity of the precedent} the reliance interests at stake, and of course 
whether the decision was well reasoned."91 
Applying these factors here, the compensation prong has 
unworkable for reasons revealed in San Remo Hotel and other The 
Court appears to have more often avoided than approved the doctrine.93 Any 
reliance interests seem attenuated and ambiguous.94 And there is much 
agt·eetnelll that Williamson County "cannot be correct, at least on its own 
terms."95 To quote four justices from San Remo Hotel: "It is not obvious that 
either constitutional or prudential principles require claimants to utilize all 
state compensation before they can bring a federal takings 
claim."96 As for constitntional (and as discussed the initial 
orientation of the compensation prong around the Fifth Amendment suffers 
from textual and historical suspicions. 97 And an understanding based in the 
Fifth Amendment or Artide HI could cause perverse consequences. 98 As for 
prudential principles, to quote the same four Justices: the Court still "has not 
explained why we should hand authority over federal claims to state 
courts, based simply on their relative familiarity local land-use 
decisions and proceedings, while allowing plaintiffs to proceed directly to 
federal court in cases involving, for example, challenges to municipal land-
use regnlations based on the Fh't Amendment or the Equal Protection 
Clause."99 Nor, it seems, could the Court do so. 11}i) 
91. Mnnte-Jo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009). The Supreme CAJmt ha£ outlined 
other formulations for approaching the prindpit: of stare Jecisiti, but this i~ an emch:nt 
formulation that works well here, 
92. For an interesting: inventory ot s,omc settings when? the compensation prong and a 
related principle applicable in the context create work.ahiUty concerns, sec 
Merrill, supra note 1, at 165:5-66, 
93. See id. at 1634-36. 
One could surmise that the ;;.:urrent scheme c::::,:~,~~~~~,!g:m;;;rcrnment officials to 
in :more extensive property re<>trki:inns than would engage in. But nne 
94. 
also surmise lhe op}X;tSile. SeeM at 1667-69. 
95. Michad W. McCAJnndJ, Home aml the NormaUzation 
Rtsporue to [u;lwverria, 43 E)JVTL L. REP. 10749, 10751 one can 
argue that because of preclusion rules, "there was nothing 'premature' about the takings ctalrr1s 
in [!.Villiarnson County], at least if premature is read to mean, as it nalun>IIY that the 
claim can become matmx; (or at oorne in the future." John Ed1cv•:rria. Horne v. 
Department of lnvilulhm tv noctritte tn TakingJ 
Liligation, 43 ENVTL L. REP. 10735,10743 (2013). 
96. San Remo Hotel, LP. v. City 8r Cly. ot S~u1 I:mncl<>CO:. 545 t:'.S. 323, 3-49 (2005) 
( Rehnquisl~ C.J., concurring in the Judgment). 
97. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55. 
98. See supra text acarmpany:ing notes 57-70. 
99. $an R¢ttt0 Uutrl, S45 U,5, al 350-Sl (1\elm<,]Uh<l, C,f., concurring in the jodgm.;;nt) 
(dtahons omitted). 
100. See McConnell, supru note 95, at 10751. 
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I generally advocate rejecting or limiting dubious doctrines that prevent 
parties from enforcing their constitutional rights or prerogalives. 101 But the 
sheer number and impurt of doctrines potentially put at risk should caution 
the Court against rejecting the compensation prong based on broad 
objections to prudential rules at Perhaps the Court should ultimately 
abandon some ostensihly rules. But it should not do so-or 
encourage lower courts to act along simllar lines-through a case that 
focuses on one narro'\\' and idiosyncratic issue (iike Knick). 
Moreover, misgivings about applying prudential principles could push 
courts toward recaLegorizing jurisdictional doctrines as stemming from 
constitutional or statutory roots. Rut doing so has important real-world 
effects. Deeming doctrines constitutional "lock[s) Congress out of dialogues 
about how to eliminate or operationalize federal jurisdictional limits," whkh 
may "harm!] congressional efforts to expand access to federal courts" and 
"raises its own set of democratic concerns:'w::: And deeming doctrines 
statutory cmnpels defendants to ralse then1 early in the litigation process. 
requires state courts to abide by them~ and subjects state decisions to 
Supreme Court reviewY" To be dear, there are good arguments that courts 
should conceptualize certain jurisdictional doctrines with fuzzy foundations 
as constitutional or statutory requirements. But courts should not rush into 
such rulings simply because of a rapid repudiation of prudential principles. 
Put dilJerently, it is "highly doubtful" that every principle in the 
jurisdictional context that someone attempts to characterize as prudential 
would "go by the wayside" were the Court to continue castigating or even to 
cast aside prudential limitations in Knick. 101 At a minimmn, courts would 
likely sort some rules into constitutional or statutory buckeL;;. The primary 
problem is that many rules would lie in doubt in the meantime. And a 
secondary problem is that rebranding possibly prudential areas as 
constitutional or statutory in charncter could cause other unintended and 
unwelcome consequences. 
In Knick, therefore, the Court should regard the prong as 
prudential in ;;haracter but reject it for independent reasons. And beyond 
the Court should ra:onsider other purportedly prndentiallimitations 
on federal in cases that more squarely them.w 
101. .See Cmckt:r, supra note 4; Katherine Mims Crocker, lnm:uniry and 
CUM$tltUtiNtal $tructure, 117 MICH. L REV. 2019}; Kathenne Mhns Cro.:ker, 
Note, Securing 501'Cre(t;n 97 VA. L Rr.v. 2051 ll" 
102. Smith, supra note 5, at R7K 
103. stipm note 78, at 159-60. 
104. ld. at 163. 
105. It bears mentioning 1hat rny vk"'>¥' of how and the Court should reJect the 
compensation prong m Knick vis-a-vis Hs possible status as A contradicts 
the apparent viC:\\' of at tcast one other observer. See Jod Knick v. of Scott, 
PcJmsylvauia: "Treasorr to the Cmrs:tifu!ion," LEAST DAl\G£ROL1S llT.OG Hh 
2018), 
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CONCLUSIO 
Knick presents an opportunity to overturn the Williamson County 
compensation prong, which requires would-be federal takings plaintiffs to 
"ripen" their claims by pursuing state procedures for seeking just 
compensation. The Supreme Court should seize this opportunity, but it 
should do so in a specific way. The Court should view the compensation 
prong as prudential rather than constitutional in character and discard it as 
poorly imagined and sorely impractical. V·-lere the Court instead to eliminate 
the requirement because of opposition to prudential limitations on federal 
jurisdiction in general, a cascade of negative effects for doctrines far and 
wide could follow. 
